Common Surnames not registrable, Pakistan legal perspective
Courts in Pakistan lave also consistently refused registration if the trade‑mark is likely to cause deception or confusion. Thus, the Dacca High Court, when Pakistan was not yet divided, in the case of a pharmaceutical company refused registration to a party applying for getting one of its products registered under the trade‑mark “Livatogen”. The Court observed that a product under the trade‑mark “Livogen” stood registered since 1942 and had a wide circulation. As the words “Livatogen” and “Livogen” were likely to create confusion in the public mind and purchaser of ordinary prudence likely to be deceived, registration was refused.
Similarly, in the case of Monsanto Co. v. Gul Ahead Textile Mills Ltd.42 Qadeeruddin Ahmad, J. accepted the appeal of the appellant who was using the word “Resloom” as its trade mark on a chemical preparation, which was a liquid and was used for treating textiles for giving a finish and resistance to shrinkage of such goods. This business of the appellant was carried on in the United States of America. The respondent imported 2,375 lbs. of this preparation from the appellant for using it cn the textile piece goods manufactured by him. Subsequently, the respondent decided to adopt the word “Resloom” as the trade mark of his textile piece goods and also applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks for its registration as a trade mark. This was opposed by the appellant. But as the evidence disclosed that neither party had acquired any reputation for this trade mark in the Pakistan market, the Registrar rejected the appellant’s opposition. The appellant appealed to the High Court where the respondent disputed the appellant’s contention that there was a likelihood of deception or confusion if the same trade mark was used oft goods of two different classes. The Court rejected the respondent’s plea observing that the real point is not whether the goods belonged to the same class or to different classes, but whether there is any trade relation between them of such a nature as to create an impression that the manufacturer of one might be the manufacturer of the other: or the products of the goods of the other manufacturer might have been used in the production of the goods of the other manufacturer. As there was a likelihood of deception and confusion from this point of view, the appeal was allowed. Ten years later, in 1978, the same High Court reiterated that once it was established on the evidence that deception or confusion was probable, the Registrar (of Trade Marks) was bound to prohibit registration of the proposed trade mark in the public interest.”